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[18 C. (2d) 512]

[L. A. No. 17219.

In Bank.-Aug. 27, 1941.]

Estate of HARRY C. JANE'S, Deceased. IVA A. VROOM,
Appellant, v. DOROTHY LEE JANES CURTISS. Respondent.
[1] Trial-Findings-Form-Inclusion in JUdgment.-Findings of

fact may be included in a judgment or order.
[2] Wills-Probate-Order-Recitals.-A statement in an order
denying probate of a will that "the court being satisfied from
said evidence that the instrument offered for probate in
connection with such petition for probate of will is not the
last will and testament of said decedent, and that the said
deceased died intestate," is a sufficient finding of the ultimate
facts in issue.
[3] Id. - Probate - Evidence - Notation Attached to Will.-A
notation, attached to a will but not incorporated therein by
reference, to the effect that it is a copy of the testator's last
will the original of which is in his safe deposit box, is admissible in evidence not as part of the will, but on the issue of the
testator's int~nt.
.~
[4] Id.-Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Showing
of Intent-Parol Evidence.-Evidence outside a will may be
introduced, not to alter its provisions, but to show that it
was not intended by the testator to be effective as a will.
[5] Id.-Construction-Province of Court-Review.-The proper
interpretation of a notation attached to an instrument to the
effect that it is a "copy" of a will is a question of law in the
absence of extrinsic evidence, which question may be reviewed on appeal from an order denying probate.
[6] Id.-Construction-Avoidance of Intestacy.-The effect of a
notation attached to an instrument to the effect that it is a
"copy" of a will should be determined in the light of the circumstances of the. case and the policy of the law favoring
testacy, rather than intestacy. A will that is complete and
valid on its face should not be denied probate except upon the
presentation of convincing proof that it was executed without
testamentary intent.
2. See 24 Cal. Jur. 975; 26 Cal. Jur. 1071.
5. See 6 Cal. Jur. 328; 26 Cal. Jur. 879.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Trial, § 322; 2. Wills, § 468; 3. Wills,
§ 465 (4); 4. Wills, §202; 5. Wills, § 270; 6. Wills, § 286 (1) j
7, 9. Wills, § 210; 8. Wills, § 249.

[7] Id. - Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Writing
Held Testamentary-"Copy".-An instrument which on its
face purports to be a complete and valid holographic will
and which is accompanied by a notation to the effect that it
is a "copy" of a will should be admitted to probate in the
absence of extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the word
"copy" and in view of the testator's death-bed statements as
to a testamentary disposition in accordance with the instrument in question, and as to the presence where the instrument was found of instructions as to things to be done after
his death. (Estate of Harris, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 606, 40 Pac.
(2d) 566, disapproved.)
[8] Id. - Revocation - Disappearance of Instrument - Presumption.-The mere inability to find a so-called original will does
not prevent probate of a will accompanied by a notation that
it is a "copy" on the theory of a presumed revocation, and that
the revocation of one instrument revokes duplicates (Prob.
Code, § 76) where there is no evidence that anyone had ever
seen the "original" will and the only evidence of its existence
was the statement in the notation. When the missing will
is a duplicate in the decedent's possession, all the facts bearing on the possibility of revocation, including a death-bed
statement regarding a bequest in accordance with the purported copy, must be considered in determining whether a
presumption of revocation arises.
[9] Id. - Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Writing
Held Testamentary-"Copy".-Either of two or more valid
duplicate wills may be probated if there is no evidence indicating that the missing copy was destroyed with intent to
revoke, and if there is no basis in its disappearance for a
presumption of revocation. The stringent requirements for
proof of lost or destroyed wills are inapplicable in such case.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County denying probate of document as will Kurtz
Kauffman, Judge pro tem. Reversed.
S. S. Hahn and W. O. Graf for Appellant.
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Leo V. Youngworth and J. Harold Decker for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J.-This appeal is from an order of the superior court denying a petition for the probate of a document
alleged to be the last will and testament of· Harry C. Janes.
The decedent died on December 9, 1938, in the county of Los
18 C. (2d)-17
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Angeles at the age of 66 years. .After his death appellant,
a chiropractor who had been attending him professionally for
· several years, found the purported will in a suitcase belonging
,to him. The instrument on its face is a valid holographic
,will. Attached tothe instrument; however, is a slip of paper,
unsigned and undated; on which appears in decedent's hand· writing: "This is a copy of ;my last Will, the original' is in
my safe deposit box." No other will was found in decedent's
safe deposit box or among his effects.
'.The' will offered for probate is dated November 1, 1938,
and contains a bequest of $5000 and two automobiles to the
appellant. The residue of the estate is left to Dorothy Le.e
,J"anesCurtiss, the decedent's daughter, who is named execu',true: There is evidence that the night before decedent died
, ':he told appellant that he was leaving her $5000 and his two
)cars, and that he insisted that appellant go to his apartment
for a suitcase containing the ownership certificates to the automobiles and instructions as to what should be· done after his
'death. Appellant found in the suitcase the purported will,
as well as decedent's life insurance policy, a draft for $250
· to be filled out and sent to his daughter, the ownership certificates to the automobiles, instructions concerning his funeral
· and the disposition of his body, and an authorization to appellant to take charge of his personal effects.
The trial court, finding that the purp'orted will was not
decedent's last will and testament and that he died intestate,
denied the petition for probate.
Appellant objects to the asserted failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact. The court's' order, however, in· eluded the following: " ... and the Gourt being satisfied
.from said' evidence that the instrument offered for probate in
connection with said petition for probate of will is not the
last will and testament of the said decedent, and that the said
deceased died intestate. . . . " [1] Findings of fact may
be included in a judgment or order. (Hopkins v. Warner,
109 Cal. 133, 139 [41Pae. 868] ; Hibernia Savings & Loan
Society v. Clarke, 110 Cal. 27, 32 [42 Pac. 425] ; In re Bensfield, 102 Cal. App. 445, 448 [283 Pac. 1121. See Estate of
Exrerstein, 2 Cal. (2d) 13, 15 [38 Pac. (2d) 151J.) [2]
The court's finding was upon the ultimate fact in issue and
was therefore sufficient. (See cases cited in 24 Cal. Jur. 975.)

...
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[3] Appellant contends that the notation attached to the
will is not admissible in evidence and cannot affect the operation of the document as a will because it was not incorporated
by reference therein. It is not necessary, however, for the
notation to be incorporated by reference since it is admissible,
not as part of the will, but upon the issue of testamentary
intent. [4] Appellant maintains that the parol evidence
rule as applied to wills does not permit the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to show that a testator did not intend as
his last will and testament an instrument that purports to be
such on its face. It is clear, however, that evidence outside
the will may be introduced, not to alter its provisions, but
to show that it was not intended by the testator to be effective
as a will. (Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd ed.) sees. 2413, 2421;
Clark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107 S. E. 730J; In re Wt'lliam's
Estate, (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. (2d) 1078.)
[5] The question therefore is whether the decedent's
designation of the instrument in question as a "copy" is
sufficient, standing alone, to justify the trial court's implied
finding that the testamentary intent necessary to make the
instrument a valid will was lacking. Since there was no
extrinsic evidence as to the meaning attached to the word
"copy" by the decedent, the proper interpretation of the
notation is a question of law (See 9 Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd
ed.) 522; and cases cited in 6 Cal. Jur. 328) which may be
reviewed on appeal. (Texas Co. v. Todd, 19 Cal. App. (2d)
174, 185 [64 Pac. (2d) 1180]; Wall v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 33 Cal. App. (2d) 112,117-118 [91 Pac. (2d) 145].)
[6] The effect of the notation should be determined in the
ligh t of the other circumstances of the case and the policy of
the law favoring testacy rather than intestacy. (Estate of
Spitzer, 196 Cal. 301, 306 [237 Pac. 739].) An interpreta_
tion of a will that prevents intestacy is preferred (Prob. Code,
section 102; .Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal. (2d) 683, 690 [107
Pac. (2d) 607] ; Estate of Fay, 145 Cal. 82 [78 Pac. 340, 104
Am. St. Rep. 17]), as is a construction favoring validity, in
determining whether a will has been executed in conformity
with statutory requirements. (Estate of Wilkinson, 113 Cal.
App. 645 [298 Pac. 1037] ; Estate of Durlewanger, 41 Cal.
App. (2d) 750 [107 Pac. (2d) 477].) "When a man of
~ound mind and memory, by his own hand and signature, has
plainly made a disposition of his property, the courts should

I
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carry out his intention if it can be done without violating the
mandates of the law." (Estate of Fay, supra, at p. 87.) A
will that is complete and valid on its face should not be denied
probate except upon the presentation of convincing proof
that it was executed without testamentary intent.
[7] The designation of an instrument as a "copy" is not
alone· sufficient to establish that the decedent lacked testamentary intent in executing the instrument. The word
"copy" implies that the instrument so labeled is identical
'with another instrument. It does not indicate that the
"copy" was intended· to be less effective as a will than the
instrument which preceded it. There is no reason why a
testator may not execute two valid wills with identical provisions to insure the execution of his wishes should one of them
be accidentally lost or destroyed. If it is properly executed,
a copy of a will is in effect the same as a duplicate (In re
Dawson's Estate, 277 Pa. 168 [120 Atl. 828]. See Great
WesternPo'U)er 00. v. Oakland, 196 Cal. 131, 136, 137 [236
Pac. 3071; 1 Burrill's Law Dictionary (2nd ed.) 526), and it
is clear that a properly executed duplicate may be admitted.
to probate. (See 1 Alexander, Commentaries on Wills, 137.r'
In the present case the instrument presented to the court
for probate is on its face a complete and valid holographic
will. It states that it is the testator's "last Will and Testament." (cf. Estate of Major, 89 Cal. App. 238 [264 Pac.
542].) The existence of testamentary intent is borne out by
the decedent's declaration on his deathbed that he had made
a testamentary disposition of his property in accord with the
provisions of the instrument in question, by his statement
that the suitcase contained instructions as to what should be
done arter his death, by the presence in the suitcase of all the
documents dealing with the disposition of his property and
. affairs aft~r his death, and by the fact that no other will could
be found: . The notation designating the will as a "copy" is
not sufficient, in. the absence of other evidence as to the decedent's meaning, to establish a lack of testamentary intent in
.executing the instr~ment as a will.
The. decision in Estate of Harris, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 606 [40
Pac. (2d) 566], cited by respondent, must be confined to the
facts of that case. There, two inc()nsistent holographic wills
were found, each dated the same day and each marked
U,Copy" upon the face of the document itself. One was

Aug. 1941.]
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found after decedent's death among letters and receipts in
a drawer of her desk, and the other with duplicate income
tax reports. There was evidence that at least one original
will had existed, and no evidence of continued testamentary
intent. Insofar as the opinion in that case is inconsistent
with the principles here stated, it is disapproved.
[8] The failure to find the so-called original will after
decedent's death does not prevent the probate of the will in
question. If a will last seen or known to have been in decedent's possession cannot be found after his death, it is presumed that he destr()yed it in his lifetime with intent to
revoke it (Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641 [250 Pac. 676]), and
the revocation of one instrument revokes all duplicates.
(Prob. Code, section 76.) In the instant case, however, there
was no evidence that anyone had ever seen the" original" will
and the only evidence of its existence was decedent's statement in the notation. The decedent might have intended to
execute another copy of his will to be kept in his safe deposit
box and failed to do so; but this would not prevent the probate of the will produced. (Parrott v. Parrott's Adm 'x,
270 Ky. 544 [110 S. W. (2d) 272]; 1 Page on Wills (Lifetime ed.) 132. See In re Zell's Estate, 329 Pa. 312 r198 Atl.
76] . ) Under these circumstances, there is no evidence to
support the theory of a revocation.
Moreover, when the missing will was a duplicate in decedent's possession, all the facts bearing upon the possibility
of revocation must be considered in determining whether a
presumption of revocation arises, not solely the circumstance
that one of the duplicates cannot be found. (See 35 Harv.
L. Rev. 626; 1 Alexander, supra, 140.) In the instant case,
decedent's statement regarding his bequest to appellant was
made only a few hours before his death. Had he desired to
revoke his will, he could easily have destroyed the instrument
produced. (See Estate of Thompson, 44 Cal. .A.PP. (2d) 774
[112 Pac. (2d) 937]; Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393 [106
Atl. 731].) Since intent is essential to revocation, (Prob.
Code, section 74 (2) ; 1 Page, supra, 764; 1 Alexander, supra,
140) these circumstances showing that decedent did not intend
to revoke the will prevent any presumption of revocation from
arising.
[9] The statute relating to lost or destroyed wills has no
application because the petition did not seek to probate a lost
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or destroyed will, but a complete, valid holographic will. If
valid' duplicate wills are executed, either may be probated if
there is rio evidence indicating that the missing copy was
, destroyed with intent: to revoke, and if there is no basis iIi
its 91sappearance for a presumption of revocation. The
stringent requirements. for proof of lost or destroyed wills
are imposed to avoid fraud. In the instant case the existence
of fraud is preciudedby the production of a valid will executed by the testator, together with evidence that it contained
the disposition that he wished to make of his property, and
that' it was in his possession until the time of his death and
could have been destroyed by him had he wished to revoke it.
For these reasons, the finding of the trial court was not supported by the evidence and its order denying probate is therefore reversed.

J. J. FLEJMING et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. J. R.
BENNETT et at, Defendants and Respondents; A. C.
BARHAM et al., Appellants.
[1] 'Waters - Procedure-Trinl-Rcference-Time of Ordering.Under the Water Commission Act, § 24 (Stuts. 1913, p. 1012,
as amended, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 9091), a suit for
determination of rights to water or the use thereof may be
referred to the division of water resources immediately after
. theflling of the complaint and before the filing of pleadings
by the' defendants. The words "issues involved," occurring
in the, section, do not apply only to issues joined or framed
by the pleadings. On the contrary, the court is given a broad
discretion as to when and how much of the investigation or of
co'nducting hearings and taking testimony should be referred.
[2] Id.-Procedure-Trial-Reference-Constitutionality of Statute.-Water CommIssion Act, § 24, providing for a reference

2. See 26 Cal. Jur. 89.
McK. Dig. References: 1-5. Waters, § 731; 6. Waters, §738.
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[Sa, Sb] rd. - Procedure-Trial-Reference_Report as Evidence.
The report of the division of wa.ter resources as referee, pursuant to an order authorized by Water Commission Act, § 24,
is admissible in evidence as against objection that it is hearsay
and incompetent, and that it was compiled from ex parte
investiga tions.
[4a,4b] rd. - Procedure - Trial - Reference - Report as Prima
Facie Evidence.-The legislature has power to provide that
the report of the division of water resources pursuant to a
reference ordered under Water Commission Act, § 24, shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts reported. Constitutional
mandates are observed where the facts are not made incontrovertible and opportunity is given to refute them in court.
~

In Bank.-Aug. 27, 1941.]

c.

to the division of water. resources, does not violate Const.,
art. VI, § 1, vesting judicial powers in the courts named, since
no judicial powe,r is vested in or delegat~d to the division.
The division operates merely in an advisory capacity to the
court which itself performs the judicial function of determining the issues and rendering judgment.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Carter, J., concurred.

[Sac. Nos. 5420, 5447.

FLEMING V. BENNETT.

[5] rd. - Procedure-Trial-Supervision of Distribution Pending
Decision.-In v.iew of Water Commission Act, §§ 37, 37a,
and Code Civ. Proc., § 187, in an action to quiet title to water
rights in a river, the trial court has authority, after submission of the case, to make an interlocutory order directing the
division of water resources, through a water master, to supervise the distribution of water in accord with the division's
report pending the adoption of findings and conclusions, and
directing that the cost of such supervision be apportioned
among the water users, where in the circumstances such supervision is necessary.
[6] Id. - Procedure - Judgments-Subsequent Orders-Distribu_
tion Through Water Master.-Following the jUdgment in an
actiol), to quiet title to water rights, the court has power by
supplementary order, to direct that the division of water resources, through a water master, supe.rvise the distribution of
water during the current irrigation season in accord with the
provisions of the judgment, and that the cost thereof be
apportioned among the water users after opportunity to be
heard thereon, where the evidence shows the necessity for
such order to preserve the public peace, convenience and welfare and to prevent waste, and where moreover the waters
had previously been distributed through the services of a
water master and no one is deprived of waters to which he
is justly entitled.

I
I:

!:

